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Abstract 
This paper 1 looks at the role of money as a medium of exchange 
in a competitive set-up. Together with this we have explored why, histori-
cally speaking, monetary trade and market specialization always go hand in 
hand. The set-up taken up for the purpose is derived from the well-known 
frame-work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). Our frame-work extends the 
above set-up to incorporate exchanges through trading posts for different 
pairs of goods. Here each agent is trying to choose his optimal strategy for 
trade given the best strategies of the others. The exercise reveals how a 
monetized trading post set-up can manifest itself through the agent's opti-
mizing behaviour. 




The theory of Walrasian equilibrium yields a set of prices 
at which the aggregate competitive demand for each com-
modity equals it aggregate competitive supply. Two impor-
tant issues arise in this context. The first is concerned with 
discovering the laws which guide the behaviour of the many 
economic variables, but especially prices, when the system is 
out of equilibrium. Walras (1890) tackled this problem by pro-
viding an algorithm for price adjustment which is well-known 
as the tatonnernent scheme. 
The other issue revolves around the function of an auc-
tioneer as a clearing house for commodities. All agents are 
assumed to deposit their initial endowments with this auc-
tioneer, who in turn reallocates them according to the pattern 
of excess demands. Thus, in the words of Starr (1972), "In 
a Walrasian pure exchange general equilibrium model, trade 
takes place between individual households and the market. 
Households do not trade directly with each other." Such an 
abstraction suppresses several important issues, in particular 
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the problems of direct exchange between households due to a 
lack of mutual coincidence of wants even at market clearing 
prices. Transaction costs as well as a medium of exchange can 
become crucial in such cases. This paper is devoted to these 
issues. 
When trade takes place between households in a decen-
tralized fashion, it is likely that they would be restricted to 
those between pairs of agents. More importantly such pair-
wise meetings of a particular trader with different traders 
need to be separated in time. In the absence of a centralized 
agency, each agent going through such sequential bilateral 
trade will naturally insist on the value of his incomings to be 
at least as large as the value of his outgoings. In other words, 
trades should be bilaterally balanced in value terms after each 
meeting, or, equivalently, maintain a quid-pro-quo condition. 
However, in the absence of a perfect mutual coincidence of 
wants between the agents, this quid-pro-quo may have to be 
maintained by transferring a good to the creditor for which 
he has no Walrasian excess demand. The need for a medium 
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of exchange in a competitive set-up can be best appreciated 
against this back ground, for as soon as an agent accepts a 
good for which he does not have excess demand, it takes the 
form of a medium of exchange. 
The earliest recognition of this problem came in Menger 
(1892). There have been many subsequent attempts to look 
into the role of money as a medium of exchange, but it was 
Hicks (1969) who posed it in the context of a Walrasian equi-
librium. The last couple of decades saw further progress in 
this branch of the literature. In fact it has been a shared view 
(Starr (1972) Ostroy & Starr (1979), Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1989)), that money as a medium of exchange is an indis-
pensable tool for attaining ones desired allocation. One then 
naturally asks which particular good can emerge as a medium 
of exchange through the agent's own optimizing behaviour 
aimed at transactions cost reduction. The time needed to 
attain ones desired allocation starting from the initial endow-
ments is universally considered as a transaction cost which 
every agent wishes to minimize. 
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However, in order to deal with the problem, these authors 
have considered an institutionally vacuous economy insofar as 
trades are assumed to take place in the absence of specialized 
markets. All agents are assumed to gather in one place and 
meet in pairs to explore trading possibilities. In this context, 
together with developing the role of money as a medium of 
exchange, we would explore why, historically speaking, mone-
tary trade and market specialization always go hand in hand. 
How far is it advantageous from the point of view of trans-
actions cost to have monetary trade coupled with the social 
institution of markets ? 
The set-up taken up for the purpose is derived from the 
well-known framework of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) where 
each agent is trying to choose his optimal strategy for trade 
given the best strategies of the others. Here, the optimization 
is done on an agent's life time utility, with respect to transac-
tions cost. Several Nash equilibria can be derived, revealing 
in the process the different goods which may play the role of 
a medium of exchange. 
Our framework however extends the above set-up to in-
corporate exchanges through trading posts for the different 
pairs of goods. The exercise reveals how a monetized trading 
post set-up can manifest, itself through the agents1 optimizing 
behaviour. 
More precisely, when the cost of establishing and running 
a market is not very high as against a marketless trading 
arrangement, the social institution of markets can reduce the 
transaction costs (through a reduction in time cost) to the 
extent of dominating all possible equilibria. 
The next section reviews some of the earlier work in the 
literature. Section 3 describes the basic frame-work under 
consideration. The penultimate section looks into the equi-
librium strategies and makes a comparison between a trading 
post and a market less set-up. The concluding section sums 
up the findings. 
2. A brief review of the literature 
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Once the role of money as a medium of exchange had 
been emphasized, the literature began to ask which commod-
ity could be a "good" choice as a medium of exchange, i.e., 
which commodity, if used as a medium of exchange, could 
lead the agents to their desired allocation within a reasonable 
time span. An attempt to characterize the commodity led 
Ostray and Starr to impose the following condition on the 
money good. 
^ Pc[zkc]+ < PMwkM 
cjtM 
where c is the index for commodities. M the index for the 
money good, the excess demand of agent k for good c 
with Zkc > 0(< 0) if k is an excess demander of c (if k is an 
excess supplier of good c), 
[zjtc]+ = max[0,ztc] and 
WkM the initial endowment of good M for agent k. 
Thus, this condition implies that if there exists a com-
modity such that the initial endowment of it is large enough 
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for each agent of the economy for them to back up all their 
desired purchases with this good, then its use as a medium 
of exchange allows agents to attain the equilibrium allocation 
for any competitive economy in at most one round.; that is, 
after each agent visits each other agent once and only once. 
Clearly, the above condition imposes a strong restriction 
on the initial endowment of the money good. However, it 
has been shown later by Starr ( 1976 ) that if one removes 
all the conditions on the money good and allows every good 
to be a means of payment, the time requirement can become 
unboundedly high. 
In order to keep a balance between the two extremes of 
Ostroy and Starr ( 1974 ), Starr ( 1976 ), a need to look for a 
more plausible condition has been felt. In this respect we have 
shown that if a good is (finally) demanded in positive quan-
tities (however small) by all the agents of the economy then 
using that good as a medium of exchange, equilibrium can 
be attained in finite time (see Dasgupta, D. and M. Rajeev 
(forthcoming)). 
To emphasize the role of the social institution of markets 
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in monetary trade, it has been further shown in the context of 
Ostroy-Starr (1974) framework (see M. Rajeev (1996)) that 
the time requirement to attain equilibrium allocation in any 
competitive economy is bounded above irrespective of the size 
(number of agents) of the economy, when trades take place 
through trading posts. Conversely, this time cost, in the ab-
sence of markets can become indefinitely high as population 
grows. This reveals the advantages of market specialization 
for large economics. The following discussion is going to ad-
dress the same Issues in a game theoretic framework. 
3. The frame-work 
As with Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) we consider a com-
petitive economy in a state of equilibrium, consisting of three 
types of infinitely lived agents (type 1, 2 and 3) each special-
ized in consumption and production. Every type consists of 
an equal number of agents producing one unit of a specific 
good. There are three indivisible commodities, viz., goods 1, 
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2 and 3. Type k agents derive utility from the consumption of 
good k only and are able to produce k* (7^  k). In our model 
we assume 1* = 2, 2* = 3, 3* = 1. As soon as a type k agent 
acquires good k he consumes it and produces one unit of k*. 
Each good can be stored at a cost, but an agents capacity to 
store is restricted to one unit only. Let b,tc denote the cost 
(in terms of instataneous disutility) to the type k agents of 
storing good c. It is assumed that 0 < b^  1 < < For 
a type k agent, let Uk denote the instantaneous utility from 
consumption of good k net of disutility of producing k* and 
j3 G (0,1) the common discount factor. An economy with 
these features is denoted by E. 
For the economy E we consider two types of trading ar-
rangements viz., the marketless arrangement and the trad-
ing post set-up. In a marketless arrangement (Kiyotaki and 
Wright (1989), Aiyagari and Wallace(1991)), the agents meet 
each other randomly in pairs (irrespective of the goods they 
want to trade) and exchange of goods takes place when it is 
mutually agreeable. 
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On the other hand in a trading post set-up there exists 
three different markets to deal with good 1 against 2, good 
1 against good 3 and good 2 against good 3. By the (c, d) 
trading post we refer to the market where good c is exchanged 
against good c!. Agents wishing to trade good c against good 
c' visit the (c. d) trading post where buyers and sellers (of c 
against d can identify each other and meet and trade). It 
appears therefore, that trading post set up would be able to 
avoid meetings between agents who are unlikely to benefit 
from trade. However, though there is a saving of time cost in 
the economy, one needs to incur additional costs (above the 
storage costs) for the setting up and maintanance of a market 
system. More precisely, let "lCC/ be the per period cost to be 
incurred by an agent trading in the (c, c') trading post to run 
the market (it. includes eg. tax payable, electricity charges 
etc.). 2 
We would consider two types of alternative relations amongst 
JHere we have made these costs market specific. Similar exarcise can be 
carried out if one makes these costs agent specific or alternatively dependent 
on the good one wants to sell in that market. 
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the costs to be incurred in a trading post, set-up. 
CAS EI bk 2 + 712 < hi + 731 < bk3 + 723,712 < 731 < 723-
CASEI1 6*2 + 712 > hi +731 > +723,712 > 731 > 723-
All other possible relationships can be considered and delt 
with similarly. It is assumed that the net utility uk is large 
enough compared to the costs (measured in terms of instan-
taneous disutility) so as not to induce any agent to drop out 
of the market economy. This may be ensured through the 
following sufficient condition. 
_ > _ > + 7cC V f , d d 
U k 1 - {3 ~ I-P 
In a set-up with trading posts a type k agent has two pure 
stategies: either to go for direct barter i.e., to exchange k 
against k* directly or to go for indirect trade by exchanging 
k' against some good c and then c against k. In the next 
section we would examine the possible equilibrium strategies 
for such a scenario. 
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4. Equilibrium Strategies: 
4.1 Set-up of complete marketisation 
Here we look for the steady state Nash Equilibrium strate-
gies 3 for Cases I and II separately under the assumption that 
trades can be carried out only through the trading posts, i.e.. 
market less trading is not permitted. In both these situations 
fundamental strategies (see Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)) can 
be shown to be the equilibrium strategies. More precisely, it 
means that the type of agents for whom the storage cost of 
the goods they produce plus the running cost of the markets 
3A steady state Nash equilibrium is a set of trading strategies Sk one 
for each type fc, together with a steady state distribution p which gives the 
proportion of type k agents with good c, that satisfies 
(i) each individual k chooses Sk to maximize his expected utility given the 
best strategies of others and the distribution p; 
(ii) given Sk, p is the resulting steady state distribution. 
The exercise holds even when we introduce an additional it once for all fixed 
establishment cost which satisfies the condition that an agent's expected 
life time utility covers the cost. 
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relevant for their direct barter trade is the highest, would opt 
for indirect trade by using a good with lesser transactions cost 
(a good which they neither produce nor use for final consump-
tion) as the medium of exchange. Naturally, the trading post 
that would have been relevant for their direct barter will not 
function. Thus, we have: 
Proposition 1: Under Casel, the fundamental strategies 
in a trading post set-up forms a set of equilibrium strategies 
under the following sufficient condition: 
/3 
713 - 712 < - u 3 
Proo f : See Appendix. 
The above condition ensures that the discounted net util-
ity gain from direct barter trade for a type 3 agent exceeds 
the additional cost he has to incur to run the (1, 3) market. 
In an exactly similar manner one can establish, 
Proposition 2 : Under Case II, the fundamental strategies 
in a trading post set-up form a set of equilibrium strategies 
for all parameter values. 
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In the equilibrium under Case I of Proposition 1, the type 
2 agents would go for indirect trade by using good 1 as a 
medium of exchange whereas in the equilibrium of Proposition 
2, the type 1 agents would act as the intermediaries. 
Let us now define the welfare derived by a type k agent as 
WFk = (1 - P)Y,PkcVkc 
c 
where, pkc is the proportion of type k agents with good c in 
the steady state and Vkc is the utility derived by a type k 
agent by acquiring good c. 
If we were to compare the steady state welfare levels (see Kiy-
otaki and Wright (1989)) of the equilibrium of Proposition 1 
with that of corresponding fundamental equilibrium in a mar-
ket.less economy we arrive at the following result : 
Proposit ion 3 : For the economy E defined above the wel-
fare of every agent is higher under the fundamental strategies 
in a trading past set-up as compared to that of the marketless 
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trading arrangement, if the following conditions hold : 
0u\ ^ Put (3u2 1, 
> 712, — > 713, — > - ( 7 1 2 + 713) 
P r o o f : See Appendix. 
Thus, if Uf,'s are sufficiently large (and the discount rate is 
not very small) as compared to the cost of running a market, 
a trading post set-up would always dominate a marketless 
arrangement. 
Kiyotaki and Wright have also shown that none of the 
equilibrium strategies in a marketless arrangement are Pareto-
optimal. For, a nonirnplementable strategy (to be called S ) 
which directs every pair of agents to exchange the respective 
goods they possess (whenever they meet) can be (welfarewise) 
Pareto superior if uk's are sufficiently high. But left to them-
selves, the traders would never opt for this strategy and hence 
it would not constitute an equilibrium. However, if 7cc,'s are 
not very high as compared to the u k % fundamental strategies 
in a trading post set-up can even dominate S with respect to 
welfare. 
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4.2 Mix of trading post set-up and marketless arrangement 
The above results (in particular. Propositions 1 and 2) are 
derived under the assumption that trades are to be carried 
out necessarily in the respective trading posts. This need not 
always be desirable especially if the cost of establishing and 
running a market is prohibitively high. Therefore, a natural 
question arises : If the option of trading in a marketless set-up 
is available together with a trading post set-up, will trading 
without some markets be preferred to trading through them, 
resulting thereby in the coexistence of marketless trading and 
exchange through a network of trading posts ? Under some 
restrictions on the parameter values, the answer to this ques-
tion is in the affirmative. 
Thus, consider the following set of strategies : 
Ski '• type k agents go for direct barter through a trading 
post. 
Skr> : type k agents go for indirect trade through a trading 
post. 
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sk3 : type k agents go for direct barter through marketless 
trade. 
Sk4 : type k agents go for indirect trade through marketless 
set-up. 
Sk5 :-type k agents go for indirect trade first in a market and 
then in a marketless set-up. 
She •• type k agents go for indirect trade by trading first in a 
market less set-up and then through a trading post. 
Thus we have the following result : 
Proposit ion 4 : Under Case I, the strategy profile ( S l h S 2 6 , S33 
constitutes a set of steady state Nash equilibrium strategies 
if the following conditions hold 
~ 712 > 0 and p31{/3u2 - (621 + 7 l 2 ) } > 6-23 - b2l 
where, p}2 is the steady state probability of meeting an (type 
2) agent with good 1 in the (1, 2) market by a type 1 agent 
and pal is the probability of meeting a type 3 agent with good 
1 in the marketless set-up. 
18 
Proof : See Appendix. 
Under the strategy profile (Sn, S26, S33) the type 1 agents 
would go for direct barter in the (1,2) trading post and the 
type 3 agents would opt for direct trade in a marketless set-up. 
It is the type 2 agents who would act as the intermediaries by 
exchanging good 3 against good 1 in a marketless set-up and 
then buy good 2 for good 1 in the (1,2) market. 
This equilibrium, however, will be Pareto non-comparable 
with the one of Proposition 1. This is because type 1 agents 
are going to be worse off in this new equilibrium as their 
complementary trading partners (i.e., the type 2 agents) are 
now going through a more time consuming trading process, 
whereas the type 3 agents would be better off if the running 
cost of the market relevant for them, i.e, 731, is sufficiently 
high. Thus we have 
Proposition 5 : The equilibrium derived in Proposition 4 
is Pareto non-comparable with that of Proposition 1 if the 
running costs of some markets (viz., (1,3) and (2,3)) are suf-
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ficiently high. However, if 7cc/'s are sufficiently small, in par-
ticular 7CC/ goes to 0 for all (c, c') and the welfare levels are 
positive, the equilibrium under complete marketization (of 
Proposition 1) is welfarewise Pareto superior to the equilib-
rium derived in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4 establishes our intution that the utility of 
trades through monetized markets cannot be dominated by 
monetized trade in the absence of markets. However, under 
reasonable assumptions, the former would in fact be superior. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper looks into the possibility of trade through a 
trading past set-up vis-a-vis a marketless trading arrange-
ment. In this context, several interesting steady state Nash 
equilibria are derived and the steady state utility levels are 
compared. However, we are concerned here only with com-
modity money. The use of fiat money in the process of ex-
change is an important issue which needs detailed study too. 
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The role of fiat currency in a search theoretic marketless 
framework has been discussed in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993, 
1991, 1989). 
In Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), fiat money is introduced 
as a commodity with least (in particular 0) storage cost. Due 
to the indivisibility of the real commodities and one unit stor-
age space availability, it is not possible to hold fiat currency 
and a real commodity simultaneously. It is then shown how 
the lack of faith in fiat money makes it an unusable medium of 
exchange in Nash's sense. However, if on the contrary every 
one believes that others will accept fiat money then fundamen-
tals (storage cost) and marketability both acting favourably 
together makes it in equilibrium a medium of exchange. 
Let P units of fiat money be required to buy one unit 
of each of the real commodities and real balance is defined 
b y R = M S t e a d y s t a t e utility level or welfare for a type i 
agent can be shown to be > 0, Vi, as long as [7,'s 
are not too large. Using fiat money reduces inefficient stor-
age of real commodities. However, since introduction of fiat 
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money in turn reduces real commodities, which can have an 
unfavourable effect on the frequency of consumption, welfare 
improvement cannot hold unconditionally. 
In this context it would be interesting to examine how 
these conditions on Ui change with the introduction of the 
social institution of markets and its effect on the velocitv of 
circulation of a fiat money. 
One can also try to extend this framework to study the 
effect of money illusion. For example, if an agent holds a part 
of the medium of exchange as wealth for his future use the 
amount of money available in the system would get reduced. 
This in turn would effect the transactions costs. It would 
be interesting to see whether in the steady state equilibrium 
welfare would increase or decrease. 
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proof of Proposition 1 
Let VkD and V/ denote respectively the (expected, dis-
counted, lifetime) utility derived by a type k agent by going 
through direct and indirect trades respectively. We want to 
show V? > V / , Vf < Vl and V? > V* 
Let us first consider a type 1 agent. As soon as he decides 
to go through direct barter he has to pay the costs b12 + 7 1 2 • 
Next period he would meet a type 2 agent with good 1 with 
probability p21 and attain net utility m and the entire process 
starts again. With probability (1 - P21) he has the option of 
choosing Vf or V( whichever is larger. 
Vf = - (6 i2+7 i 2 )+^b2 i (m+ma 2 ; (V f ,F / ) ]+( l -P2i )max(V 1 Z ) ,y / 
When he decides to go through indirect trade, he would visit 
(2,3) market and for entire life time would not meet any com-' 
plementary trading partner given V2D < Vj and V^ > . 
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Hence 
y, . , ^ ^  > 
Similarly, one can show that V j and V3D are also opti-
mal strategies (under the condition on the parameters stated 
above). It can be easily checked that in the steady state, 
P21 = i 
Proof of proposition 3 : 
For a marketless set-up (see Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)) 
= ^ - b u , wF2 = = 
For a trading post set-up 
= (l-flVf = _ ( 6 1 2 + 7 l 2 ) + § U l and WFZ = ~ (b 3 1 + 7 3 1 )+? 
^ 2 
For a type 2 agent let V 2 1 and V 2 3 denote respectively 
the indirect utilities of acquiring good 1 (by visiting the (1, 
3) trading post) and of acquiring good 3 (by visiting (1, 2) 
trading post i.e. by acquiring good 2 and then producing good 
3). We have p2i — P23 = 
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V b = - ( 6 2 3 + 7 l 3 ) + ^ 2 1 , 
V21 = -(621 + 712) + P(U2 + ^23) 
/ 1 1 \ /3U2 (623 + 713) + (&21+712) 
W F 2 = ( 1 - / 5 ) + 2 V 2 3 j = ~ 2 2 
Comparing W 7 £ with WF* we get the result. 
Let WF* denote the welfare derived by a type k agent 
under the strategy profile S. It can be shown that (see Kiyotaki 
and Wright (1989)) : 
/3m 1., . . . ^ - . g ^ 2 , 623 + 621 - 1 
w f 3 = - ^(6 2 3 ~ 6 3 1 ) " 6 3 1 
Thus, if 
and + I(632 - 631) - 713 quantities are non-negative we get 
I V < WF~hyk. As can be seen if Lt 7cd 0, then 
W < WFk holds unconditionally. 
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Proof of Proposition 4 : 
Let Uki denote the (expected, discounted, lifetime) utility 
derived by a type k agent by adopting the strategy Ski(i = 
1,2,. . . , 6 ) . 
J 
Un = - ( 6 1 2 + 7 1 2 ) + ^[Pi2(«x+"»o«(^fei,* = l , 2 , . . . , 6 ) ) 
+ ( 1 = 1,2, . . . , 6 ) ] 
where p p is the probability of meeting a trader with good 1 
in the (1, 2) trading post. U u = f/13 = - As -0 
Uu = - b 1 2 + /5[p23{-6i3+J>3i(wi + mar(J7jW,i = 1,2,.. . ,6) 
+ (1 ~ P ^ m a x i U ^ i = 1 , 2 , . . . , 6)] 
where i s steady state probability of meeting a type 2 
agent with good 3 in a marketless set-up when a type 1 agent 
adopts Su,p'31 is the steady state probability of meeting a 
type 3 agent with good 1 in a marketless set-up when a type 
1 agent adopts Su,vi3 is the indirect utility of acquiring good 
3 by a type 1 agent. 
rr &12 + 723 
U t t = " T T j r 
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tfie = i = 1,2 6)] 
p'2'3 is the probability of meeting a type 2 agent with good 3 
when the type 1 agents opt for 
Now given the optimal strategy of the type 2 agents, in 
the steady state p'23 = 0. Thus, Un will be optimal if -(b 12 + 
712) + P p \ 2 u I > ^12 
Pp]2u\ - 712 > 0. 
Proceeding in a parallel fashion it can be shown that U7& 
would be optimal if P3i{/?"2 ~ (&21 + O12)} > 2^3 - hi- Simi-
larly optimality of U33 can be shown. 
Steady State Probability Distributions : 
Let j}- and y - be the steady state proportions of the type 2 
agents in a marketless arrangement and in a trading post set-
up respectively. Thus, in the steady state (for the equilibrium 
of Proposition 4) we get : 
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Pi" = 7v a n t i P23 = probability of meeting a type 2 agent with 
in the marketless arrangement (by a type 
Ni 
N + Ni 
P3i • probability of meeting a type 3 agent with good 1 in the 
marketless arrangement (by a type 2 agent) p31 = 
Also in the steady state 7Vi.p3i = No. Using these relations 
we get 
y / E - 1 12 2\/5 — 4 3 -
» i — j - , Pi = " y f T T ' P 2 3 = 2 
Proof of Proposition 5 : 
We define welfare in an exactly similar manner as that of 
proposition 3. Let Wk be the welfare derived by a type k 
agent under the equilibrium strategy of Propostion 4. 
Then 
Wi -(&i2 + 712) + (.38197)/3Ul 
< - ( 6 1 2 + 7 1 2 ) + \pux = Wi, p\2 = ~ 3 8 1 9 7 ^ v/5 — 1 
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and 
# 3 * -(63i)+/5(-38197)U3 
= _ 6 3 1 + I / 3U 3 - - 1 1 9 0 3 ^ 3 
< V T 3 if . 1 1 9 0 3 / 3 U S - 731 > 0 
Am 
2^1 = 1 -/?2P31 
[ f l foa + b 2 l + 712) + 
V23 = W ? 2 P 3 1 
It can be checked in a straight forward manner that if 
7cc, 0 ,V(c ,c) and > 0,Vfc then < Wfc, Vfc. 
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